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In an effort to challenge some prevailing 
assumptions surrounding the art of the 
painter Wols—whose work various critics in 
the late 1940s associated with the expression 
of existential unease—Alex Potts proposes 
that what Wols truly wished to convey was 
“a real sense of the substance of the world,” 
its “bare non-art materiality” (119–20). An 
anecdote supplied by the critic René Guilly 
on the occasion of Wols’s 1947 Paris exhibi-
tion provides some evidence for that conten-
tion, even as it reveals the artist’s feelings of 
inadequacy in the face of his task. Walking 
by a decomposing wall glimpsed through 
a pane of broken glass, Wols is said to have 
lamented, “My painting will never achieve 
that” (119). He may have meant that his art 
was incapable of the immediacy and direct-
ness he associated with the “real.” Perhaps, as 
Potts suggests, Wols’s disappointment came 
from recognizing that his desire for “ren-
dering the reality of things” in their “brute 
materiality” was incommensurate with 
working in mediums that were each bound, 
for better or worse, to sets of historical con-
ventions that conditioned artistic representa-
tion (120). Nonetheless, in Potts’s ambitious 
account of twentieth-century realism, some 
version of Wols’s aspiration—to convey as 
if directly the “vivid actuality” (326) and 
“material substance” (3) of things—widely 
animates the experimental practices of post-
war artists.
Indeed, it is on the basis of a shared 
desire to evoke the “non-artistic actualities 
of everyday life” (113) and to “embody a 
compelling sense of the underlying fabric 
of things” (157) that Potts sees the artists 
his study gathers together as united against 
the hegemony of modernist abstract paint-
ing—especially insofar as it was critically 
championed as concerned solely with resolv-
ing certain historically generated formal 
problems in an effort to make explicit a 
medium-specific logic of development. Potts 
offers us an expanded notion of realism, not 
simply defining it against abstraction, but 
seeing it as a strategy that connects previ-
ously sequestered artists. So the late paint-
ings of the Abstract Expressionist Roberto 
Matta Echaurren are realist because their 
imagery evokes a techno-scientific world 
impinging on human subjectivity, and so 
are the smashed musical instruments of the 
French New Realist Arman, who appropri-
ated junked material as a way to comment 
on the waste at the root of the modern 
consumer society. Moving expertly between 
better- and less-studied figures—from Jean 
Dubuffet, Andy Warhol, and Gerhard Richter 
to Eduardo Paolozzi, Öyvind Fahlström, and 
Asger Jorn—Potts shows how an eclectic 
stable of artists responded to what they felt 
was modernist art’s constricted range of 
reference, and modernist criticism’s nar-
row perspectives, by cultivating strategies 
that were meant to be “evocative of the lived 
realities of the contemporary world” (174). 
Those realities, for Potts, are characterized by 
the “unstable, constantly shifting interactions 
between bodies and things and environ-
ments in the modern world, as well as the 
underlying processes of production, con-
sumption and destruction shaping this world 
and its anxieties and compulsions” (327).
It is not Potts’s undertaking to explain in 
detail the historical roots and contemporary 
consequences of these underlying processes; 
nor is it his mandate to trace in detail the 
historical parameters of modernity’s abstract-
ing tendencies. These are not his goals. But 
if the absence of those accounts is felt by 
some readers to be a gap in the author’s text, 
it is a necessary consequence of his balanc-
ing the wide range of work he investigates 
with finely tuned descriptions of particular 
examples.1 Even so, Potts evokes throughout 
his account the systematic antihumanism 
of late capitalism as the chief motivating 
factor behind mid-century experimental 
realism. The domain of modernity’s instru-
mentalized, rationalized, and dehumanizing 
structures constitutes a kind of basic setting 
against which the practices of artists stand 
out in sharp relief. It is primarily in resis-
tance to political and societal abstraction—to 
a perceived distancing of individual feeling, 
thought, and action from an affirmative 
collective setting—that a number of artists 
develop procedures to convey more directly 
the “embeddedness of human subjectivity in 
the materiality of the body and the material 
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the representational significance and evocative 
power of a work, not just the literally non-
artistic identity of the materials from which 
it is made” (7, emphasis added). Still, certain 
passages seem to collapse the difference 
between the literal and representational. For 
example, some French New Realists wanted 
to “effect a more direct encounter” between 
art and audience not just by representing, 
but by “embody[ing] a truly immediate and 
vital sense of modern reality” (207, emphasis 
added). The implicit idea that literal materi-
als somehow embody content has important 
consequences for understanding the relation 
of intention to expression. When we admit 
no discrepancy between actual materiality 
and the content which some material object 
is meant to convey, we suspend the criteria 
by which we can determine what the work 
(or action) of art is. If we don’t know what 
the work of art is, we have no principled 
means by which we can make interpretative 
claims about it. To see material as identical 
to content is to make no distinction between 
what an artist means and what he or she 
doesn’t mean.4
While he values the evocative “reso-
nance” of works that seem to be produced 
without conscious planning, Potts ultimately 
appears to validate the intentional character 
of artistic production. Meaning as such, he 
says, requires “some level of intentionality” 
(52) that would guarantee the “significance 
substance and fabric of the world around it” 
(72). Both Jackson Pollock and Dubuffet, for 
instance, permitted a sense of the material 
substance of paint to so fully absorb them in 
the act of painting that subsequent viewers 
might similarly feel “literally immersed” (79) 
in their canvases, or stimulated into “reliv-
ing the physical activities and sensations 
that were involved in making” them (137). 
By identifying her position with that of the 
artist, a viewer would entertain not just a 
metaphor of practice and process, but would 
actually experience a kind of situatedness 
that is noticeably absent from her experience 
at large.
In his evaluation of what makes mod-
ernist art in its putatively insulated and 
self-referential forms inimical to a broader 
integration of art with life, Potts reaffirms 
as central to understanding the art of this 
period a commonly asserted, if somewhat 
reductive, antithesis between autonomy and 
engagement. If modernism accords priority 
to the former term, experimental realism 
is concerned with the latter. It is of course 
possible to see autonomy in a positive light 
as counteracting a chaotic reality which 
operates in its everyday unfolding as repres-
sive ideology, and so modernist art might be 
seen as a successful challenge to disorder and 
insensitivity everywhere.2 But a skeptic might 
argue that modernist artists can establish 
only fictions of aesthetic wholeness, order, 
or self-sufficiency. On this view, modernist 
autonomy, with its illusion of wholeness, 
becomes a kind of evasion of the facts: an 
unsustainable, fictive release from the deter-
mining realities of politics and struggle in 
the real world. Experimental realists reject 
the privilege usually accorded to the fictive 
mode and see modernist forms of abstrac-
tion as incapable of a “more compelling evo-
cation” of reality (140).3 
Here is where the experience of the 
“everyday”(55) confronts the formalistic 
conception of “pure” art (202) with his-
torical reality and places an ethical demand 
on those artists who would be “truer to 
the conditions of the times” (159–60) by 
expressing that experience through art. It is 
important to bear this emphasis in mind. 
Potts acknowledges a distinction between the 
literal (our actual experience) and the repre-
sentational (how an artist frames that expe-
rience). “Artistic realism,” he cautions us at 
the outset of his argument, “has to do with 
[of details] beyond their mere particularity” 
(53). While “some” seems to hedge against 
according too much importance to inten-
tion, and while it is true that the practices of 
experimental realists often seem to eschew 
deliberate attempts to realize a preconceived 
image, their resulting works (or events) are 
nonetheless delimited and framed by artistic 
intentions. While Rauschenberg’s Rebus (1955) 
might appear to be composed of an arbitrary 
selection of everyday images and materials—
a selection, moreover, that might entice the 
viewer to draw any number of connections 
between the elements, or to entertain the 
contingent associations they evoke—the 
work nonetheless “constitute[s] a kind of 
totality” (274). In fact, it is nothing less than 
Rauschenberg’s directed manipulation of 
his heterogeneous materials that enables, in 
Potts’s great description, the “constellation of 
motifs and images [to] constitut[e] a world 
of a particular kind, which like the worlds 
one inhabits is never fully graspable or con-
tainable” (274). Here, the artist’s potential 
for “world-making” is fundamentally tied to 
representing (as opposed to actualizing) his 
“experience.”
Still, Potts’s obvious sympathy with the 
antiformalist works and practices he dis-
cusses occasionally dampens the reader’s 
awareness of the author’s representational 
commitments. Potts tends to express the 
challenge experimental realism poses to 
modernist autonomy by describing realist art 
as “concrete,” “direct,” “immediate,” “par-
ticular,” “brute,” and “actual.” But are these 
terms meant to designate the literal character 
of an experience or material, or instead to 
describe representational effects? At a num-
ber of places in the text, it is unclear. Potts, 
though, usually provides guidance, remind-
ing his readers that experimental realism 
“evokes,” “suggests,” “portrays,” “conveys,” 
“references,” or (a preferred term) “reso-
nates” with the “facticity of things” exter-
nal to the realm of art. These latter terms 
connote art’s representational character. 
So, while Potts focuses on the “directness 
and crudity” of the realist devices Edward 
Kienholz deployed in his installation Roxy’s 
(1962) and agrees with early critics who 
saw the artist as achieving a striking impact 
through an “uncompromisingly direct ren-
dering of real-life subjects” (293), Potts 
notes—the point is crucial—that it is only 
the “apparent absence of aesthetic qualities” 
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that allowed Kienholz to “convey [his] highly 
charged content with such immediacy” (293, 
emphasis added). The artist, in other words, 
carefully orchestrated the effects of his art.
If experimental realist artists reach out 
to the political, cultural, social, and eco-
nomic conditions of the modern world, they 
do so by means of material made into artistic 
media (this is true whether “material” is 
understood in its traditional application or 
as an expanded category including artists 
and viewers in a live situation). “Any realist 
work,” Potts writes, “even the most paltry 
or conventional one, is different in its literal 
substance from the reality it represents” 
(28). Art represents reality; it does not just 
present us with real stuff. While Potts is not 
as explicit in this book as he is in The Sculptural 
Imagination about the critical stakes of the 
debate between literalism and representation 
(there he provides a sustained discussion of 
the issue), he implicitly recognizes what we 
might call an ontological distinction between 
the work of art (and by extension, the artist’s 
meaning it expresses) and its actual material 
(and whatever contingent associations those 
materials might inspire a viewer to make). So 
although to some readers it might sound as if 
what makes experimental realism significant 
for the history of art is its identification of 
meaning with the viewer’s literal experience, 
nothing could be further from the truth. In 
fact, all the artists Potts discusses are intent 
on framing, and thus delimiting, the experi-
ence of their viewers (even if those “viewers” 
are “participants”). Merely because a work 
or event produces an effect of de-authored 
meaning does not imply that the artist has 
turned over the determination of meaning to 
the audience. 
In an art-historical landscape increas-
ingly exposed to and tolerant of various 
aspects of “new” materialisms—thing 
theory, object-oriented ontology, speculative 
realism, affect theory, and neuroaesthetics, 
to name the most prominent—Potts’s book 
is a reminder of the contribution art history 
can make to contemporary debates about 
meaning and agency in other fields. Although 
he does not address directly the aforemen-
tioned lines of inquiry, his arguments for 
the artwork’s meaning over its mere par-
ticularity have wide impact. Positions that 
overemphasize materiality, for instance, tend 
to redescribe the work of art as identical 
to its physical features, so much so that all 
of the material features of the object—as 
well as all the configurations into which it 
contingently falls—are seen to contribute 
to its meaning. If that is so, it would seem 
that all of the physical characteristics of the 
environment or situation within which the 
object commands our attention must also 
matter, including all of the characteristics 
we might identify with the position (actual 
or metaphorical) of a viewer. One might 
legitimately wonder how interpretation—
which targets what the work of art means, in 
contradistinction to what we experience it 
as—factors into a situation where descrip-
tions of the object’s effects trump arguments 
about the artist’s intent, and where questions 
about understanding are replaced by ques-
tions about what the reader or viewer feels 
or experiences. 
Although the phenomenon is not with-
out its theoretical problems, contingency 
is at the heart of Potts’s contention that 
experimental realism offers a more compel-
ling artistic engagement with the conditions 
of the world than does high-modernist art. 
Key to the disruption of what it takes to 
be the fiction of abstraction’s autonomy, 
realism sets up a “contingent interplay” 
between the material fabric of the artwork 
and the culturally determined references 
it makes (41). This interplay is dialecti-
cal. The material configuration, according 
to Potts, has a “generalised evocativeness” 
that explains why viewers are compelled 
to attend to the work (or event) in the first 
place. But unless its evocations are directed 
to an identifiable reality, the work or event, 
and our responses to it, will remain “insub-
stantial and subjective” (42). At the same 
time, the presence of clear referents “never 
abolishes the contingent and unstable nature 
of what is being conjured up” by the art-
ist (42). So, Potts argues, Happenings may 
attract us by virtue either of their banality 
or their “melodramatic excess” (344), but 
the event is destined to remain meaningless 
unless the nonart materials it intentionally 
incorporates into its staging connect to the 
wider world to “embody significant aspects 
of modern life [and] . . . certain underly-
ing realities of human existence” (342). 
Kaprow’s Happenings may have appeared 
utterly contingent, but they were based on 
scores that were “carefully crafted creations 
with a clear artistic and conceptual rationale” 
(339) intended to make events that were 
“expressive and symbolically loaded” (344). 
Similarly, viewers of Fahlström’s painting-
assemblages are asked to be active partici-
pants in the ensemble, but their actions are 
subject to certain constraints or rules, which 
ensured that their participation would not 
produce just “arbitrary and inconsequential 
rearrangements” (303).5
Admittedly, many of the artists Potts 
discusses make work that, in its structural 
organization or performative display, seems 
to invite viewers to entertain the fiction that 
they create their own meaning from the 
proliferating associations occasioned by their 
encounters. But the overall thrust of Potts’s 
argument demands that we recognize the 
difference between association and interpre-
tation. The artist may indeed make work that 
“baffles” and “frustrates” coherence (177), 
but the viewer’s various “constellations of 
meaning” (35) will remain arbitrary unless 
they are advanced as claims and supported by 
arguments about what specific constellations 
the artist intended us to entertain, however 
much he or she tries strategically to create 
the effect that the work is not a “deliberate 
contrivance” (236). 
Still, Potts’s investment in the contin-
gency of meaning runs the risk of sounding 
like an endorsement of anti-intentionalism. 
Realism “open[s] itself up to contingen-
cies of meaning and reference inherent in 
the materials . . . and that get into the work 
regardless of and sometimes despite the per-
spective that the artist brings to bear” (318). 
But if meaning is inherent in materials, it is 
hard to anticipate where that would leave the 
practice of interpretation as it is traditionally 
understood. For instance, in a discussion of 
the various wartime associations a viewer 
might project onto Richter’s photographi-
cally based painting Christa und Wolfi (1964) 
—which features a large Alsatian dog like 
those used by the Nazi police—Potts suggests 
that the expressive overtones such imagery 
solicits were “not simply put there by the 
artist but to a degree inhere in the image given 
by the photograph” (246, emphasis added). 
And discussing Joseph Beuys’s action I Like 
America and America Likes Me (1974), Potts con-
cludes, “The work comes to mean something 
because in the viewer’s mind the references 
to some larger reality are suggestively but 
also somewhat bafflingly embedded in the 
immediate sensory substance of the work” 
(401, emphasis added). Glossing a quote by 
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Rauschenberg, Potts notes that since politics 
was a pervasive dimension of the environ-
ment in which the artist worked, his materi-
als were “saturated with political meaning, not 
because he put such meaning there” (315, 
emphasis added). If meaning is inherent in 
materials, though, then it must be divorced 
from what the artist might have wanted to 
express or convey. Consequently, we need 
feel no compulsion to advance claims or 
make arguments about what we think she 
meant.
In the end, what makes the effect of 
contingency in experimental realist art polit-
ically significant is the dialectical opposition 
it offers to the repressive situation from 
which it springs. Potts explains this relation 
in The Sculptural Imagination:
The instability of a viewer’s encounter 
[with the work of art is] integral to any 
affective and conceptual power it might 
have, as well as to any resistance it might 
offer to being consumed as a mere com-
modity. Yet such instability . . . [para-
doxically] conforms to the disintegrating 
drive of an increasingly pervasive and 
unrestricted process of commodification, 
consumption and capital accumulation.6
The objects and practices Potts investigates 
in his study simultaneously reflect and resist 
the processes of capitalism. Ian Hamilton’s 
paintings, which present their viewers with 
highly incongruous arrays of nearly illegible 
but still recognizable imagery, strongly evoke 
but ultimately stand “at odds with the seam-
less assemblages of the advertising world” 
(179). Heterogeneity, juxtaposition, colli-
sion, disruption, incongruity: these aspects 
of experimental realist art—as object, or 
action, or some hybrid of the two—confront 
the “constant proliferation, replication and 
reconstitution of imagery in modern media 
culture” (232). Potts expresses the dire situ-
ation in these terms (again, in The Sculptural 
Imagination):
In the circumstances of contemporary 
capitalism’s unrelenting dissolution and 
remaking of those cultural norms that 
momentarily mediate between the indi-
vidual’s self-awareness and a sense of 
the larger social and economic realities 
within which this self-awareness is con-
stituted, the compelling art work will no 
longer be one that purports to embody 
some stable essence of individual subjec-
tivity. If a work gives rise to a vivid sub-
jective awareness, this awareness cannot 
seem to be encapsulated in some poten-
tially inert and fixed objective thing.7
The modern condition of which Potts so 
ardently writes seems for experimental 
realists ever more present, intruding ever 
more deeply into every aspect of social and 
psychological life. The complexities of that 
incursion are made manifest in a diversity 
of artworks and practices that the author—
through his unflinching commitment to the 
idea that art challenges the deleterious effects 
of those incursions, as much as through his 
irrepressible optimism that in doing so art 
draws us closer to our historical reality—
brings to life for his readers.
1. For instance, although in a discussion of  French 
New Realism Potts mentions the prewar debates 
between Communist realists and abstract artists 
of  various political persuasions (48), he misses 
an opportunity to bear down on the historical 
specificity of  that moment and doesn’t investigate 
how that contest and its postwar legacy—and 
the fluctuating political, economic, and ideological 
conditions underpinning each moment—consti-
tuted a key background for some of  the artists he 
gathers under the experimental realist umbrella. 
In France, for example, the debates held in 1936 
at the Maison de le Culture, a cultural center run 
by the French Communist Party, and published 
as La Querelle du Réalisme, explored exactly this 
terrain. For an analysis, see Toby Norris, Modern 
Artists and the State between the Two World Wars 
(PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2005), esp. 
192–96. The same questions regarding realism, 
abstraction, and politics were raised again after 
the Second World War, although in a more polar-
ized climate shaped by the influence of  the French 
Communist party, which had thrown its weight 
behind an orthodox realism of  explicitly politi-
cal intent. See Natalie Adamson, Painting, Politics 
and the Struggle for the École de Paris, 1944–1964 
(Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2009). 
2. The phrase is from Ad Reinhardt, who wrote, 
“A painting of  quality is a challenge to disorder 
and insensitivity everywhere.” Reinhardt, “How 
to Look at Space,” PM, April 28, 1946. For a 
discussion of  modernist art’s capacity to cri-
tique repressive ideology and conservatism, see 
Charles Harrison, “Disorder and Insensitivity: The 
Concept of  Experience in Abstract Expressionist 
Painting,” in American Abstract Expressionism, ed. 
D. Thistlewood (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1993), 111–28. 
3. It is a tactic of  some historians of  1960s art first 
to conflate and then attack the positions of  the 
critics who best articulated high-modernist criti-
cism—Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried—
for what they take to be their narrow essentialism 
(although Potts, to his credit, does not). That 
reductive tendency is often accompanied by an 
almost willful avoidance of  what those critics 
in fact say. Admittedly, a strand of  Greenberg’s 
thought tended increasingly to emphasize the 
discovery of  an irreducible essence of  picto-
rial art. But for the critic’s view on the historical 
relation of  autonomy to convention, see the 
triumvirate of  important essays from 1947 to 1948, 
“The Present Prospects of  American Painting and 
Sculpture,” Horizon, October 1947; “The Situation 
at the Moment,” Partisan Review, January 1948; 
and “The Crisis of  the Easel Picture,” Partisan 
Review, April 1948. All three essays are reprinted 
in volume 2 of  Clement Greenberg: The Collected 
Essays and Criticism, ed. John O’Brian, 4 vols. 
(Chicago and London: University of  Chicago 
Press, 1986–1993). For Fried’s account of  his 
attempt to historicize the concept of  essence 
as found in some of  Greenberg’s writings, see 
“An Introduction to My Art Criticism,” in Art 
and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago and 
London: University of  Chicago Press, 1998), 1–76, 
esp. 36ff.
4. For an analysis of  this distinction, see Walter 
Benn Michaels, The Shape of  the Signifier: 1967 
to the End of  History (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), esp. 1–18.
5. From one perspective, it is possible to see the 
dialectical interplay of  materiality and cultural 
reference that Potts theorizes as an attempt 
to address a dualism, stemming from romantic 
aesthetics, that remained latent in high-modernist 
criticism. If  the romantic tendency is to establish 
a dualism between art (broadly associated with 
beauty, disinterest, and the intuition of  aesthetic 
unity) and science (as the domain of  the practical, 
utilitarian, and empirical), Potts finds the most 
convincing artists to be those who are open to 
everyday praxis—and is compelled by art that 
can express the fundamentally temporal and 
historical involvement of  agents in the world. That 
emphasis lends to his account of  experimental 
art a certain existential cast (as do his occasional 
references to the work of  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Martin Heidegger). For a 
useful discussion of  the dualism as it appears in 
the writings of  some existential phenomenolo-
gists, see Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism 
(Chicago and London: University of  Chicago 
Press, 1980), esp. 81–90.
6. Alex Potts, The Sculptural Imagination: Figurative, 
Modernist, Minimalist (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 23.
7. Ibid., 18.
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